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Abstract
This paper presents the Merlin network management
framework. With Merlin, network administrators express
functionality such as accounting, bandwidth provision-
ing, and traffic filtering in a high-level policy language,
and use automated tools and mechanisms to implement
them. The framework includes: (i) a declarative language
for specifying policies, (ii) infrastructure for distributing,
refining, and coordinating enforcement of policies, and
(iii) a run-time monitor that inspects incoming and out-
going traffic on end hosts. We describe Merlin’s policy
language and enforcement infrastructure, illustrate the
use of Merlin on case studies, and present experimental
results demonstrating that Merlin is more efficient and
scalable than equivalent implementations based on pro-
grammable switches and centralized middleboxes. Over-
all, Merlin simplifies the task of network administration
by providing high-level abstractions and tools for speci-
fying and enforcing rich network policies.
1. Introduction
Programmable network platforms, such as those based
on the OpenFlow protocol [17], have made great strides
towards simplifying network administration. These plat-
forms provide APIs that let administrators manage for-
warding rules, gather traffic statistics, and offer ba-
sic quality-of-service guarantees. The key advantage of
these platforms is that they provide a single point of con-
trol that saves administrators from having to manually
manage and configure each individual device in the net-
work. Their success is a testament to the difficulties of
managing large-scale networks, as well as the need for
automated tools and mechanisms to ease the burden for
network administrators.
Expanding on these basic building blocks, this pa-
per aims to further raise the level of abstraction for pro-
grammable networks and enable the rich functionality
required in networks today. As motivation, consider the
functionality that data center networks such as Amazon’s
EC2 [6] must provide:
• Accounting: To keep track of usage for billing pur-
poses, network administrators must record traffic
statistics that distinguish the in-network and out-of-
network traffic for each customer.
• Traffic filtering: To protect end hosts, network ad-
ministrators must install filtering rules on routers and
switches that detect and block malicious traffic.
• Resource provisioning: To ensure that important re-
sources such as bandwidth are allocated in accor-
dance with service-level agreements (SLAs), net-
work operators must configure port queues and traffic
shapers on devices throughout the network.
Implementing each of these pieces of functionality on
their own is not impossible, but when taken together, they
become quite challenging. Moreover, this list is by no
means exhaustive; most networks pose unique require-
ments that necessitate additional packet-processing func-
tionality.
In current networks, administrators must typically im-
plement rich functionality by forwarding traffic through
specialized middleboxes. Whether they configure the
individual network devices by hand, or write a con-
troller program, there is a disconnect between the high-
level functionality that operators want enforced (e.g., all
packets should be filtered against a given pattern) and
how that functionality is realized (e.g., by configuring
switches and routers so that all packets traverse at least
one middlebox). Moreover, the middleboxes and the con-
troller program have the potential to become bottlenecks
as the network scales. Even worse, to actually establish
that the desired functionality is implemented correctly,
the operator must reason about multiple pieces of soft-
ware, including the controller program, the switch and
middlebox configurations, and the interactions between
them via asynchronous network events. Although this
approach can be made to work, it is difficult, time con-
suming, and error prone.
This paper presents the Merlin network management
framework. With Merlin, network operators specify the
intended behavior of the network using a high-level
policy language. These policies are automatically im-
plemented by mechanisms and tools provided by the
system. The Merlin system has three components: (i)
a declarative language for specifying policies and re-
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source constraints, (ii) a collection of tools for distribut-
ing, refining, and coordinating enforcement of policies
called negotiators, and (iii) a distributed enforcement
mechanism that ensures compliance with desired poli-
cies while providing scalable performance.
The Merlin policy language provides a suite of ex-
pressive constructs for classifying and processing pack-
ets. These constructs can be used to describe a wide
range of network policies. Policies may contain both
mandatory and discretionary components. Merlin poli-
cies are ultimately evaluated by a small interpreter in-
stalled either in the kernel of end hosts (or on first-hop
switches) to determine which packets should be allowed
to traverse the network. To ensure that Merlin policies
are safe to execute in the kernel, the Merlin language
is carefully designed to eliminate undesirable behaviors.
For example, it is impossible to write programs with in-
finite loops, buffer overruns, or null dereferences.
Policy transformations in Merlin are implemented
using the infrastructure provided by negotiators. These
transformations accomplish three goals: First, they allow
tenants to modify discretionary policies to suit their own
behavior. Second, they apply explicit constraints that me-
diate access to shared resources. Third, they transform
network-wide policies into local sub-policies that can be
enforced on individual nodes in the network. This al-
lows Merlin to use a distributed enforcement mechanism
that eliminates bottlenecks and provides scalable perfor-
mance.
Merlin enforcers guarantee that network traffic com-
plies with the overall policies set down by network ad-
ministrators. Each enforcer is an interpreter for Merlin
policies. Enforcers are interposed on all packets entering
and exiting a host to determine if they should be allowed.
The policy transformations implemented by negotiators
ensure that enforcers do not need access to global state
to check compliance with the overall policy. In princi-
ple, Merlin enforcers could be deployed in a variety of
ways: on end hosts, using middleboxes, or using a com-
bination of the two. However, in this paper, we focus on
fully-distributed architectures in which enforcers execute
directly on end-hosts.
We have used the Merlin framework to implement
a range of practical policies that demonstrate the ex-
pressiveness of the system. Our performance evaluation
demonstrates that Merlin imposes low overheads on end-
hosts and, for sufficiently rich policies, scales signifi-
cantly better than equivalent middlebox or OpenFlow-
based implementations. For heavily loaded networks,
Merlin can reduce the latency of transmitting packets
by up to 95%. Overall, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• It identifies the requirements for a declarative lan-
guage to manage networks, and describes a practi-
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Figure 1: Merlin provides operators with a single point of con-
trol for expressing policies. The negotiator tranforms policies
so that they can be distributed and refined. Distributed enforce-
ment provides a scalable alternative to centralized mechanisms.
cal realization of a language that meets those require-
ments.
• It presents techniques for distributing policies, del-
egating policies, and mediating access to shared re-
sources, and an implementation of these techniques.
• It describes a fully-distributed enforcement mecha-
nism, and experimental evidence demonstrating that
it scales significantly better than centralized imple-
mentations using middleboxes and programmable
switches.
The next section (§ 2) discusses the requirements that led
to the overall design for Merlin. The following sections
discuss the three main components of Merlin in detail:
the language for specifying network policies (§ 3); ne-
gotiators that distribute and refine policies, coordinating
access to shared resources (§ 4); and enforcers that inter-
pose on all traffic to ensure compliance with the specified
policy (§ 5).
2. System Design
The overall goal of Merlin is to create a system that al-
lows operators to express policies in a declarative man-
ner, and to provide tools and mechanism that automati-
cally realize those policies. Any system designed for this
purpose must meet the following requirements:
• Expressive: Operators need high-level abstractions
that allow them to specify a wide range of global net-
work policies clearly and concisely.
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Motivation Requirement Merlin Feature
Administrators should be able
to declare a wide range of policies.
Expressive
Declarative policy language with operators for clas-
sifying and constraining streams of packets.
Administrators should write
one program to configure the network
Single point of control
Language support for global policies; infrastructure
automatically distributes and enforces policies.
Provide good performance as traffic
load grows. Scalable
Run-time enforcer components are fully distributed
on end hosts.
Support federated networks
with multiple administrative domains. Extensible
Negotiator component supports policy refinement,
and reconciling demands for network resources.
Must not leak any
information about the network.
Privacy preserving System guards against what distributed mechanisms
can reveal.
Must provide guarantees
that policies are enforced.
Verifiable
Policy transformations can be automatically verified
with a theorem prover.
Table 1: Requirements and how they impact the Merlin design.
• Single point of control: Operators need to be able to
specify the behavior of the entire network without
having to separately configure each individual device.
• Scalable: To provide good performance, the imple-
mentation of the system must scale as the traffic load
grows.
• Extensible: Because networks typically involve mul-
tiple tenants, the system must support both mandatory
policies, which are specified by an administrator and
cannot be overridden, as well as discretionary poli-
cies, which can be modified by tenants.
• Privacy preserving: The system must not expose facts
about the network such as its topology or network-
wide traffic statistics that would not otherwise be vis-
ible to tenants.
• Verifiable: The system must provide a basis for trust-
ing that network-wide policies are enforced correctly.
Table 1 summarizes how these requirements impact the
overall design of the Merlin architecture, which is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
Merlin provides a domain-specific language for spec-
ifying global network policies. The language allows op-
erators to express useful constraints on sets of packets
over time (for example, bandwidth caps). More specifi-
cally, operators can classify network traffic into sets us-
ing constructs that distinguish packets by location, win-
dows of time, and predicates on header fields and proto-
cols. These sets are then reduced to scalar values using
built-in aggregate functions, and constrained using log-
ical operators. Overall, Merlin policies provide an intu-
itive way to specify rich predicates over streams of net-
work traffic.
Merlin’s policy language is built to support two key
design choices. First, the use of network locations and
high-level constraints ensures that policies are amenable
to distribution, refinement, and coordination. Although
the language can express stateful predicates (e.g., the
amount of web traffic per hour must not exceed 5GB),
it is purely declarative and does not provide constructs
for explicitly manipulating state. Second, the limited in-
terface of constraints over sets of packets allows us to
develop enforcement mechanisms that execute on end
hosts, without adversely affecting the host itself. For in-
stance, evaluating a policy on a packet always terminates
and has predictable memory usage.
The first design choice is realized in a component
called a negotiator. A negotiator binds the aggregations
over packet sets in Merlin policies to explicit, inter-
nal state variables. It then translates the constraints ex-
pressed in the policy to equivalent constraints on those
variables. These variables and constraints enable a ne-
gotiator to apply transformations on policies, which
serves three purposes: (i) they refine broad administrator-
defined policies with specific tenant-specified function-
ality; (ii) they translate a global policy into a locally en-
forceable policy for distribution; and (iii) they reconcile
demands for shared resources that span multiple hosts.
In complex networks, multiple negotiators may be
distributed and arranged into a tree. For example, in the
network depicted in Figure 1, there are three negotia-
tors. The top negotiator distributes the global policy to
its children. The two sub-negotiators coordinate access to
shared resources—the state variables in a policy, which
make resource constraints explicit. To assign these re-
sources, negotiators may impose constraints on the state
variables, and then solve them to find sound assignments.
The assignment must be compliant with the global pol-
icy, but need not be optimal. Hence, negotiators may
renegotiate a different assignment amongst themselves
without breaking compliance.
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The second design choice is realized in the form of
Merlin enforcers—interpreters for transformed policies.
Enforcers interpose on all network traffic, and evaluate
each packet with respect to their policies. The evaluation
determines whether or not the packet can be forwarded.
Because of the distribution transformation, enforcers ac-
cess only local state during an evaluation. Collectively,
the enforcers implement a distributed runtime monitor
that is decentralized and scalable.
3. Policy Language
The Merlin policy language is inspired by previous work
on streaming query languages [1, 4] and is designed to
strike a balance between expressiveness and simplicity.
It provides a collection of declarative constructs for de-
scribing network policies including operators for classi-
fying streams of network traffic into sets of packets, for
aggregating those sets to scalar values, and for express-
ing logical constraints over those values. At the same
time, the language is designed to be simple, in order to
make policies amenable to analysis and transformation
by negotiators, and to ensure that they can be safely in-
terpreted on hosts.
As an example to illustrate the main features of the
language, suppose we want to place a bandwidth cap of
5GB/min for all incoming HTTP traffic to a pair of hosts
h1 and h2. In Merlin, we can express this cap using the
following policy:
(bytes
{ location { h1, h2 } and
eth.type ˜ 0x0800 and
ip.proto ˜ 0x06 and
tcp.src ˜ 80 over
tumbling(60) }) < 5GB
The policy is made up of several nested constructs. The
inner-most construct describes a set of packets: all pack-
ets on hosts h1 and h2 with TCP source port 80 sent or
received in the last 60 second tumbling window. Next,
the aggregate function bytes reduces this set to a scalar
value by taking the sum of the sizes of all packets in
the set. Finally, the logical constraint stipulates that this
scalar must be less than 5GB. Although simple, this pol-
icy already describes a non-trivial constraint involving
the recent traffic across multiple hosts.
3.1 Syntax
Figure 2 presents the abstract syntax of a core fragment
of Merlin’s policy language.
Sets. Merlin groups network traffic into sets of packets
using combination of predicates on packet headers and
payloads, locations, and time. If these components are
left unspecified, they match traffic with arbitrary headers
and contents, on all hosts, and throughout history.
Numbers n ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | . . .
Units u ::=B | KB | GB | . . .
Protocol r ::= ether | ip | tcp | . . .
Fields f ::= src | dst | . . .
Time t ::= sliding(n) Sliding
| tumbling(n) Tumbling
Locations l ::= {host} Location
| l ∪ l Union
Predicates p ::= r.f ∼ n Match
| location l Location
| p1 and p2 Conjunction
| p1 or p2 Disjunction
| ! p1 Negation
Packet Set s ::= {p, t}
Term t ::=n u Bytes
| n Literal
Aggregates a ::= count(s) Total count
| bytes(s) Total size
| average(s) Average size
Expression e ::= a Aggregate
| t Term
| e1 + e2 Sum
| e1 − e2 Difference
Policies P ::= e1 ≤ e2 Comparison
| P1 and P2 Conjunction
| P1 or P2 Disjunction
| ! P1 Negation
| id P1 Tagged
Figure 2: Merlin policy syntax.
Predicates. Predicates are built up using standard log-
ical operators such as conjunction (and), disjunction
(or), and negation (!). For example, the policy above
uses a conjunction of predicates to match all the way up
the stack of nested packets: Ethernet, IP, and TCP.
Locations. Merlin supports conventional syntax for
Ethernet and IP addresses. Locations are specified us-
ing literal addresses, variables, or sets of addresses and
variables. Sets of locations can be combined with a union
operator. In this paper, we will work with explicit host
identifiers. However, the language is designed to work
with symbolic sets of hosts given by variables as well,
provided the interpretation for those variables is also
given. In the example above, the policy is restricted to
hosts {h1, h2}.
Time. Merlin supports two kinds of time-based win-
dows. Windows declared as sliding(n) contain pack-
ets from the preceding n seconds. Windows declared
as tumbling(n) contain packets between the current
time and the last multiple of n. Intuitively, a sliding
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window advances continuously, while a tumbling win-
dow “falls over” every n seconds. In all cases, windows
describe a function from potentially infinite streams of
packets to finite lists of packets. The example above uses
a tumbling window of 60 seconds.
Fields. A predicate of the form r.f ∼ n describes the
set of packets where field f of protocol layer r matches
n. The field f can either be a standard field in a protocol
layer, or the actual payload of the packet. The third line
of the example matches packets where the Ethernet type
is set to IP (i.e., 0x800). Merlin provides definitions for
standard protocols including Ethernet, IP, TCP, and UDP.
Aggregates. To express constraints over sets, a policy
must first reduce the set to a scalar value using an ag-
gregate function. Merlin supports several aggregate func-
tions including count, which computes the number of
packets in the list, as well as bytes and average,
which compute the total and average size of packets in
the set respectively.
Constraints. At the top-level, a Merlin policy com-
prises a logical constraint over linear combinations of
aggregate values. In this way, policies can specify global
predicates that must hold about the stream of traffic in
the network. In the example above, the constraint limits
the total size of all HTTP traffic to 5GB.
Tags A tag is an optional identifier indicating that a
policy is discretionary. Semantically, a tag declares that a
policy constraint is unspecified, and that a tenant is free
to apply any constraints they wish. Operationally, a tag
provides a way to reference a policy that can be modified,
like a capability.
3.2 Policy Language Discussion
The Merlin language emphasizes direct expression of
network policy and simplicity. The language provides
programmers with a collection of constructs for directly
expressing the intended behavior of the network (as de-
scribed above). These constructs are powerful enough to
allow Merlin policies to express a wide range of network
functionality (as demonstrated in Section 7.1).
The language is, by design, not a general purpose
programming language. To enforce policies, Merlin pro-
grams are evaluated by an interpreter that runs inside the
kernel of the host machine (described in depth in Section
5). Therefore, safety is a crucial design consideration,
and Merlin intentionally provides a limited programming
interface. Notably, Merlin lacks an assignment operator,
and does not provide any programmer-accessible muta-
ble state. The language presents an abstraction that each
policy maintains its own copy of the packet set, although
internally sets may share pointers. As a result, executing
Merlin policies does not produce side-effects. Moreover,
the language omits several features that are a common
source of errors: there are no loops that might not ter-
minate; no arrays that might be accessed by an out-of-
bounds index; and no pointers that might reference null
addresses.
The Merlin language raises the level of abstraction
provided to operators while enabling powerful underly-
ing mechanisms to enforce network policy in novel ways.
We explore these mechanisms further in the following
sections.
4. Negotiators
Merlin negotiators implement transformations on poli-
cies. They map policies to sets of resource constraints,
and allocate global resources to network tenants. This al-
lows negotiators to transform global policies into a form
that can be independently enforced on each end-host with
minimal coordination. Negotiators are hierarchical, so
that parents impose constraints on their children. Chil-
dren can refine their own policies, as long as the refine-
ment implies the parent policy. Peers are free to renegoti-
ate resource allocations, unless the new allocation would
violate parent constraints.
4.1 Fine-Grained Resource Allocation
Before transforming a policy, the negotiator must first
bind the aggregated packet sets in the Merlin language to
explicit state variables. These state variables represent a
particular allocation of network resources. Each aggre-
gated set is assigned a fresh variable, and the variables
are substituted into the contraints specified by the policy.
For the bandwidth cap example in Section 3, the ne-
gotiator might produce a variable x, and a constraint:
x < 5GB
In this case, the variable x represents the allocation of
resources to the coarse set of hosts h1 and h2. The
equation states that the allocated bandwidth usage must
be less than 5GB/min.
Specialization To distribute policies to end-hosts, a
negotiator specializes a policy. To specialize a policy,
the negotiator produces additional state variables corre-
sponding to finer-grained allocations for each particular
host. It then emits a revised linear constraint which states
that the sum of the variables must be less than the origi-
nal bound.
For example, to distribute the bandwidth cap policy
from the previous section, the negotiator might generate
new state variables, y and z, and a new formula:
y + z < 5GB
where y corresponds to the bandwidth allocated to h1,
z corresponds to the bandwidth allocated to h2, and the
sum of the allocations must be less than 5GB at all times.
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It is easy to see that by enforcing the specialized policy
on each host, the global policy will also be correctly
enforced.
Constraint management. The key challenge for distri-
bution is to find an assignment of values to state variables
that accomplish the policy goals. To do this, the nego-
tiator can solve the constraints to find any satisfying as-
signment. As a default heuristic, Merlin attempts to find
solutions with equal values by minimizing the Euclidean
distance between the variable assignments. For the ex-
ample, the solver produces a solution where both y and
z are bound by 2.5GB. The result is a set of three con-
straints:
y + z < 5GB
z < 2.5GB
y < 2.5GB
But in fact any solution will do—any formula that im-
plies the original formula will guarantee that the original
global policy is correctly enforced. Note that it is easy
to express particular allocations as constraints within the
Merlin language itself. This allows the negotiator to as-
sign allocations such as “one host gets twice the band-
width of another,” for example.
Distribution. The last step in the transformation is to
re-write the policies in terms of the new variables and
assignments. In other words, given a single policy and a
set of n hosts, the transformation will produce n policies,
one for each host, that collectively imply the original.
The negotiator then installs the appropriate policy on
each host. For example, host h1 will get a policy that
limits the total number of bytes sent on TCP port 80 to be
less than 2.5GB in each 60 second interval. Internally, the
negotiator keeps track of which hosts have been allocated
what resources by mapping hosts to state variables, and
state variables to allocations.
4.2 Refinement and Renegotiation.
Merlin is designed to reflect the federated nature of net-
works today. To that end, Merlin policies can be refined
to suit the needs of individual network tenants. Moreover,
resource allocations can be renegotiated at the discretion
of tenants, so long as they abide by overall network pol-
icy. We have implemented several such cooperative rene-
gotiators to share network resources among tenants.
Refinement Network operators often want to delegate
policy decisions to network tenants. For example, in
Amazon EC2, network instances have certain ports dis-
abled by default, such as port 22 for SSH traffic, but cus-
tomers are free to modify the default settings to enable
those ports.
Merlin uses tagged policies to delegate policy deci-
sions (i.e., to mark them as discretionary). A tagged pol-
icy indicates that the global policy is unspecified for cer-
tain set of packets. Network tenants may apply any con-
straints they wish to a tagged policy.
In general, negotiators can modify any policy, tagged
or not, if the new policy implies the old one. That is, a
policy can always be made more restrictive.
Renegotiation Merlin negotiators allocate resources
based on the constraints in a policy. However, there are
many situations when hosts may wish to change their
allocations. For example, due to transient load, a host
might need to send more data than its current constraint
allows. Merlin allowing tenants to change their alloca-
tions through a renegotiation process. Negotiators ex-
change messages amongst themselves to agree on a new
allocation. Once an agreement has been reached, the al-
locations can be adjusted in two ways: through a central
negotiator that acts as a broker, or in a peer-to-peer fash-
ion between participant negotiators. Figures 3a and 3b
illustrate these two approaches.
In either case, the new allocation must conform to the
parent policy. A parent policy may apply to many hosts,
not just the participants in the renegotiation. At a mini-
mum, renegotiation requires the form of the parent con-
straint, the allocations of the participants, and mappings
of variables to participant hosts. Therefore, the knowl-
edge revealed during negotiation is restricted to informa-
tion about the participant hosts, and the global policy.
Because some knowledge is necessary for renegotia-
tion, choosing between the broker and peer-to-peer strat-
egy involves a tradeoff between performance and pri-
vacy. The central broker approach is privacy-preserving,
but adds the overhead of working through the broker. The
peer-to-peer approach avoids the broker overhead at the
expense of revealing information to end-hosts.
Merlin does not specify a protocol for hosts to reach
an agreement on a new allocation. The details of such a
protocol are dependent on a variety of factors, such as the
trust relationship between tenants, and the tolerance for
time spent reaching a consensus. These are exogenous
concerns better handled outside of the core system.
Merlin does provide the mechanism and means for
verifying a new allocation. In our evaluation, we use a
centralized negotiator, and a simple renegotiation proto-
col that assumes cooperative peers request reallocations
in the collective best interest.
One of the key features of Merlin is that negotiators
do not need to be trusted. All of the negotiators just de-
scribed have the property that they only change the gran-
ularity and restrictiveness of the policies they receive as
input. Hence, if the conjunction of the formula contained
in the output policies implies the formula in the input,
then the correctness of the global policy is guaranteed.
Moreover, because formulas are simple linear constraints
over variables, we can decide implications using an au-
tomatic theorem prover. In our implementation, we use
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Figure 3: Broker-based and peer-to-peer re-negotiation.
the Z3 SMT solver to decide implications between for-
mulas [18].
4.3 Negotiator Discussion
Merlin negotiators transform the high-level operator-
specified policies to achieve three goals. First, they spe-
cialize policies for distributed enforcement. Second, they
refine policies for delegation. Third, they renegotiate
policies to modify resource allocations. All three trans-
formations are achieved with the same technique: change
the granularity of the sets in the policy, apply appropri-
ate constraints, and reassign resources. This technique
provides a powerful and verifiable base layer for policy
management. The resulting system gives as much free-
dom as possible to network tenants, while still ensuring
that global policies are respected.
5. Enforcers
Merlin enforcers are interpreters for policies, charged
with ensuring policy compliance. They evaluate each
network packet with respect to the specified policies,
and determine if it should be forwarded. Although Mer-
lin policies typically involve network-wide properties en-
compassing large numbers of hosts, each individual en-
forcer does not see and is not responsible for large-scale
policy enforcement. Instead, the Merlin negotiator sends
to the enforcer only those policies that concern the pack-
ets destined to or emanating from a specific host in its
purview.
End-host enforcers are written as loadable kernel
modules. Our Linux-based implementation uses the
netfilter callback functions for access to packets
on the network stack. The interface to the enforcer is
small: it takes as input a packet and returns a boolean
value indicating if the the host should drop the packet or
allow it to proceed.
The enforcer is designed to have minimal dependen-
cies on operating system services in order to make it
portable across different operating systems. Our imple-
mentation of the Merlin enforcer requires only about a
dozen function calls to be exported from the operating
system to the enforcer, relating to bookkeeping issues
such as memory allocation and synchronization.
5.1 Expressiveness
Merlin can enforce network properties that are express-
ible as functions on histories of packets. This means that
Merlin enforcers are limited by the information available
in the packet contents. Without any changes to the net-
work, Merlin can provide a broad range of typical func-
tionality, including statistics gathering, traffic filtering,
and provisioning.
Merlin can enforce additional functionality if more
information is available in the packets. For example, if
the network employs a source-routing scheme, such as
pathlet routing [10] or a forwarding fabric [3], Merlin
can use the information embedded in tags to enforce
routing or path properties. As a proof-of-concept, we
have implemented a simple version of source-routing in
which paths through the network are enumerated and
stored in an MPLS label. With this scheme in place, we
have used Merlin to enforce traffic isolation properties.
5.2 State Management
The biggest challenge for the design of the enforcer is
managing the state required to enforce properties. Merlin
uses standard mechanisms, such as a routine to clean
up stale windows periodically, and an optional runtime
memory limit that will cause Merlin to drop packets until
windows expire.
Beyond these mechanisms, Merlin includes optimiza-
tions for handling sliding windows. Unlike aggregations
over tumbling windows, which can be computed in-
crementally, aggregations over sliding windows require
maintaining histories of packets. This is a well-known
problem in streaming systems [13]. A naı¨ve implementa-
tion of sliding windows would store packets proportional
to window sizes.
To guard against excessive memory usage, Merlin
sliding windows include a parameter for summarizing
packets. Packet summaries enable sliding windows to
advance by the amount of time specified by the sum-
mary variable, instead of continuously with time. Pack-
ets within a summary are aggregated together to reduce
memory usage. Put another way, a summary turns a slid-
ing window into a sequence of tumbling windows.
Furthermore, Merlin treats windows of infinite size
as a special case. Because no packets are ever evicted
from an infinite window, aggregate information can be
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updated incrementally, rather than being computed after
each window trigger.
5.3 Trust
Merlin assumes a trusted deployment in which all host
machines can be assumed to execute and comply with
enforcers. An interesting, but orthogonal, problem is to
deploy Merlin in an untrusted environment. Several tech-
niques have been proposed to verify that an untrusted
machine is running specific software. Notable examples
include proof carrying code [19], and TPM based attesta-
tions, such as used by ETTM [5] and the Nexus operating
system [23].
To explore the feasibility of an untrusted deployment,
we have implemented a version of Merlin that runs on
the Nexus operating system. Nexus provides proof in the
form of logical attestations that the enforcer is installed
and interposes on all network traffic.
Porting the enforcer to Nexus required modifying
only 8 lines of code in the kernel, and redefining less
than a dozen macros in the enforcer. The modest number
of required changes corroborates the assertion that the
Merlin enforcer is self-contained, and portable across
operating systems.
5.4 Host Failure
Because Merlin negotiators specifically transform poli-
cies to avoid centralized coordination, a node failure
does not affect overall policy enforcement. In the event
of a failure, a particular resource allocation will be un-
derutilized by the group including that node. However,
the overall policy will continue to be correctly enforced.
Merlin can detect a host failure during the renegotiation
process. If a negotiator detects a failure, it can reallocate
the resources formerly allocated to that host.
5.5 Enforcer Discussion
Merlin enforcers implement a distributed network run-
time monitor. Each individual enforcer is an interpreter
for Merlin policylets, and evaluates packets for compli-
ance with global network policy. Enforcers have a small
interface, with minimal dependencies on the host operat-
ing system. By providing a consistent, yet powerful tar-
get platform for the Merlin language, the enforcers en-
able network administrators to specify their policies at a
high level without having to reason about how those poli-
cies are enforced. Such a mechanism raises the level of
abstraction at which networks may be programmed and
opens up the possibility of further transformation, verifi-
cation, and optimization of the locally-enforced policies.
6. Implementation
We have implemented the Merlin framework described
in this paper. The core negotiator functionality required
2, 262 source lines of OCaml code. This involves logic
to parse and transform policies into policylets, several
negotiators, and serialize and deserialize formulas for
Z3. An additional 77 lines of code wrapped the core
negotiator component and provided network connectiv-
ity. Our implementation currently uses the Z3 SMT con-
straint solver [18] for validating resource assignments.
However, the negotiator does not depend on any Z3-
specific functionality, and could be replaced with a dif-
ferent solver.
The core enforcer functionality is a policy evaluator,
which required 3, 228 source lines of C code. The eval-
uator executes the policy and decides whether or not to
forward a packet. To pass packets to the evaluator, we
implemented a loadable Linux kernel module using the
netfilter callback functions. The kernel module required
102 lines of C code.
We have also implemented a version of the Merlin
enforcer for the Nexus trusted operating system [23].
The Nexus version of the enforcer is written as an ex-
tension to the Nexus kernel, rather than a loadable mod-
ule. Porting the evaluator component required redefining
11 macros to use Nexus-specific system calls. Modifying
the Nexus kernel to pass packets to the evaluator required
changing only 8 lines of code.
7. Evaluation
In evaluating Merlin we explore the following questions:
(i) What is the overhead for enforcing policies on the
end-hosts? (ii) How does Merlin’s distributed enforce-
ment strategy compare to a middlebox and a software-
defined network implementing the same policy? (iii)
How do different negotiation strategies affect network
utilization?
7.1 Enforcement Overhead
The overhead for enforcing policies on end-hosts is de-
pendent on both the complexity of the policy, and the
traffic being inspected. Nevertheless, we attempt to quan-
tify this overhead on several realistic policies.
For each policy, we measure the time it takes for the
enforcer to evaluate 1 million 1024-byte packets. This
experiment shows the overhead of executing the enforcer
in isolation, without any interaction with the network.
Figure 4 presents the results, which show that even with
complex policies, Merlin imposes low overheads. Hosts
running Merlin enforcers would still be able to saturate
both 1 Gigabit and 10 Gigabit links.
Below, we discuss the policies in detail. For each, we
present both the Merlin pseudocode, and a short descrip-
tion. Due to space constraints, and to improve clarity of
presentation, we present only the core required function-
ality.
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Figure 4: Enforcing Merlin policies adds little overhead.
Accounting. Many networks charge customers based
on their usage. Therefore, keeping accurate usage statis-
tics is vital. However, pricing strategies may be more nu-
anced than simply recording the total usage. For exam-
ple, a service like Amazon’s EC2 charges different rates
for sending traffic internally versus externally.
The following example implements an EC2-inspired
billing policy. It uses a tumbling window to track the
monthly usage. The policy distinguishes traffic by the
destination IP address to determine whether or not it falls
in the internal subnet (192.168.1.1/16).
(print {location 192.168.1.1/16 and
ip.dst ˜ 192.168.1.1/16,
tumbling(30) } >=0)
and
(print {location 192.168.1.1/16 and
!(ip.dst ˜ 192.168.1.1/16),
tumbling(30) } >=0)
Note that this policy uses an aggregator we have
not discussed—print, which does does not produce
a scalar value but instead prints the total size of the set
to a file descriptor. These aggregators are immaterial for
policy enforcement but are useful for recording statistics.
Tiered services. Networks commonly provide tiers of
service, based on past usage. For example, an ISP such
as Time Warner enforces a high bandwidth cap for cus-
tomers below a certain usage threshold, but enforces a
much stricter cap when the threshold is exceeded. The
following policy implements a tiered bandwidth cap.
(bytes {true, tumbling(600)} <= 20MB =>
bytes {true, sliding(60) } <= 5MB)
or
(bytes {true, sliding(60) } <= 1MB)
It tracks past usage over a long interval, and applies
two different bandwidth caps depending on the result.
Bandwidth trading. Merlin negotiators allow network
tenants to renegotiate their resource allocations for the
collective good. This is similar to systems such as EyeQ
[14], where senders and receivers coordinate individual
bandwidth constraints to control congestion.
The following Merlin policy allows an administrator
to impose a large bandwidth constraint on a set of hosts,
while delegating the ultimate fine-grained resource con-
trol to the hosts themselves.
bytes {true, sliding(60)} <= 600MB
The hosts would then either use a broker or cooperate
to subdivide the available bandwidth.
Path isolation. Many regulatory guidelines require
corporations to keep different parts of their businesses
completely separate. For example, in investment bank-
ing, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the investment
side of the company be completely separated from the
brokerage side of the company. As a result, corporate
networks want to ensure that traffic from different parts
of the network never travel along the same path.
Merlin can enforce this type of path isolation prop-
erty by leveraging prior work on source routing, which
encodes the path a packet travels through the network in
the packet itself [3, 10]. Our test application assigns each
path a separate identifier, and stores the path in an MPLS
label. The following policy inspects the label to ensure
isolation.
(count {location 192.168.1.1/8 and
ip.dst ˜ 192.168.1.1 and
mpls[0].label ˜ 0x88,
sliding(60)} == 0)
and
(count {location 192.168.1.1/8 and
ip.dst ˜ 192.168.1.2 and
mpls[0].label ˜ 0x77,
sliding(60)} == 0)
The above examples use the constructs described in
Section 3 to declaratively specify network behavior. We
can directly specify the desired behavior without having
to reason about forwarding rules, network state, or the
configurations of individual network elements. We can
safely delegate enforcement to our in-kernel enforcers
with minimal overhead.
7.2 System Comparisons
After evaluating the standalone overhead, we compare
Merlin to two current alternatives to providing rich net-
work functionality. First, we consider a middlebox ap-
proach where all traffic is routed to a centralized mid-
dlebox which implements the required functionality on a
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Figure 5: The experimental setup for latency measurements.
The traffic client and server generate cross traffic. The latency
measurement is taken on the echo client and server. The Click
middlebox applies DPI to all packets.
per-packet basis. Second, we consider an SDN approach
where only the first packet of each flow is sent to a con-
troller for further processing. The controller installs or
removes forwarding rules on a switch depending on the
processing results.
7.2.1 Experiment Setup
Figure 5 illustrates the network used in the experiment. It
consists of six machines connected by 1-Gigabit links via
an OpenFlow-enabled Pronto 3290 switch. Four of the
machines generate traffic. A fifth machine acts as a ded-
icated controller for the switch, and runs the POX [20]
controller platform. The sixth machine acts as a dedi-
cated middlebox running the Click modular router [15].
The Merlin measurements did not use the middlebox ma-
chine.
To test system scalability, we measured the latency for
sending traffic under increasing network load. All traf-
fic was subject to a policy implementing a simple deep
packet inspector (DPI). Namely, the policy identified and
dropped TCP packets that contain a particular blacklisted
URL in their payload.
We collected the latency measurements on a pair of
machines exchanging 1000-byte messages. In Figure 5,
these machines are labeled Echo Client and Echo Server.
To place load on the network, we used a second pair of
machines to generate traffic. In Figure 5, these machines
are labeled Traffic Generator and Traffic Server. The
generator forked n processes, each continually sending
data to the server. We increased the amount of traffic by
increasing the number of processes running concurrently.
We measured the traffic throughput on these machines,
and increased the load until we were unable to induce an
increase in throughput. The traffic profile was generated
according to the datacenter traffic distribution identified
by Greenberg et al. [11].
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Figure 6: A centralized middlebox implementation of deep
packet inspection shows 12 times the latency of an equivalent
Merlin implementation.
For each step of increasing load, we took 1000 la-
tency measurements, and computed the 90th percentile.
This eliminates extreme outliers due to packet loss and
retransmission. We ran each experiment three times, and
report the average results.
7.2.2 Middlebox Comparison
We compare the Merlin and middlebox approaches along
two axes: system complexity and scalability. It turns out
that enforcing even the deliberately simple DPI policy
with the middlebox approach increases system complex-
ity and results in significant packet delays when the net-
work is heavily utilized.
System Complexity For the middlebox-based approach,
we implemented the DPI policy as a Click router ele-
ment [15] and configured the network to route all traffic
through the middlebox.
The Click element loops over the packet contents
searching for the target pattern. Even this simple appli-
cation required over 60 lines of C++ code, and a separate
Click script to connect the element to the network inter-
faces. Configuring the switch required adding five rules
to the controller program to ensure that all traffic passed
through the middlebox before being forwarded to the
destination.
By contrast, the DPI policy required only one line
of code in the Merlin language. The Merlin infrastruc-
ture automatically deployed the policy to every end-host.
There were also no changes required to the controller
program or the network’s routing policy.
System Scalability The results are shown in Figure 6.
When the network is lightly loaded, the performance of
both systems are comparable. This is as expected, since
the computation performed by Merlin and the Click ele-
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ment are the same. The extra overhead for the middlebox
case, about 0.25ms, is due to the extra hops (to and from
the middlebox) that each packet needs to travel.
As the network load increases, the effects of the mid-
dlebox bottleneck become manifest. When the load is
about 750 Mbits/second, the latency spikes to over 6 mil-
liseconds, and we see an increasing number of packet
drops and retransmissions.
In contrast, the latency for the Merlin setup stays con-
stant at around 0.26 milliseconds. This is a 95% reduc-
tion in latency when the network is heavily loaded. Mer-
lin’s distributed enforcers scale far better than the cen-
tralized middlebox enforcement strategy.
7.2.3 Software-Defined Network Comparison
To compare the Merlin approach with implementing
functionality in an SDN controller, we implemented the
same deep packet inspection operation, with one small
change. Instead of inspecting every packet sent on the
network, the controller only inspects the first packet of
every flow. This is more consistent with how controller
functionality is deployed in practice.
The switch is configured to send the first packet of
each flow to the controller, and the controller searches
for the blacklisted pattern. If the pattern is not found,
it installs a rule on the switch to directly forward the
remainder of the flow from the source to the destination.
If the pattern is found, a rule is installed to drop all
subsequent packets on the flow.
Controller Implementations Network switches have a
limited table size for forwarding rules (typically a few
thousand entries). This means that under high load (large
numbers of flows), the table size is not sufficient for
the number of flows in progress. We implement three
separate methods for managing the rule table.
1. Buffering: forwarding rules are installed with a time-
out. The switch informs the controller when rules
timeout. This allows the controller to keep track of
how many rules are currently installed. If the rule ta-
ble is full, the controller delays the installation of new
rules until older rules have expired.
2. Random eviction: Forwarding rules are installed per-
manently. The controller keeps track of the number
of rules installed. If the rule table is full, it removes a
rule at random before installing a new one.
3. FIFO eviction: Forwarding rules are installed with a
timeout. The controller maintains an ordered list of
installed rules and records when each rule is due to
timeout. If the rule table is full, it evicts the oldest
installed rule that has not already timed out before
installing a new rule.
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Figure 7: Software-defined network implementations of deep
packet inspection shows orders of magnitude times the latency
of an equivalent Merlin implementation.
Experimental Results Under light load all three con-
trollers impose about the same latency. However, the la-
tency is over two orders of magnitude higher than either
Merlin’s deep packet inspection or a middlebox-based
equivalent. This is explained by the low bandwidth con-
nection from the switch to the controller (we recorded a
maximum of 300 packets a second) and the need to in-
stall forwarding rules on the switch before the remainder
of the flow can be transmitted.
Under high load the three controllers all suffer perfor-
mance degradation and latency spikes, but with different
profiles. The buffering controller provides the greatest
throughput before the latency spikes. The timeouts allow
the rule table to be cleared without controller interven-
tion, but the controller itself must respond to both new
flows and timeout notices for expired flows, essentially
doubling its load. After the point shown in the graph the
controller becomes too heavily loaded to respond reliably
to new flows. We observed that latencies become erratic
and connections time out.
The random eviction controller provides the least
throughput before the latency spikes. This is to be ex-
pected, as only a single rule is evicted at a time before
installing a new one. Thie limits how fast the controller
can respond to increasing numbers of new flows.
The FIFO eviction controller spikes at a throughput
in between the other two. Unlike the random eviction
controller, it takes advantage of flow expirations and does
not always evict rules to free up space in the table. But
at the same time, it must manage a complicated data
structure and occasionally explicitly evict rules (unlike
the buffering controller). The overhead of maintaining
this data structure and evicting a rule at a time prevents
scaling to higher throughput and causes higher latencies.
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Figure 8: Different renegotiation strategies.
While software-defined networks can provide some
rich functionality by performing computation at the con-
troller, they incur a high performance penalty (even if
processing on a per-flow basis). For all but the most
lightly loaded networks, this penalty is unacceptably
high. Merlin can implement the same functionality on
a per-packet basis, and with very low overheads.
7.3 Renegotiation
Merlin negotiators can support a wide range of re-
source management schemes. We implemented two com-
mon approaches: a priori knowledge of resources and
additive-increase, multiplicative decrease (AIMD) adap-
tation. With a priori knowledge, network tenants declare
their resource requirements ahead of time, and the nego-
tiator tries to satisfy their requests. With AIMD, tenants
dynamically adjust resource demands, incrementally try-
ing to increasing their allocation.
Figure 8 shows the bandwidth usage over time for
two hosts exchanging bandwidth utilization using the
two negotiator strategies. Both hosts attempt to send as
much UDP traffic as possible to a common server, shar-
ing a 1 Gigabit link. In practice we achieved a maximum
throughput of 800 Mbit/s for UDP traffic (even without
any enforcers or negotiators). Merlin enforcers impose a
bandwidth cap on both hosts, similar to the bandwidth
trading example in Section 7.1. The two negotiators ad-
just their resources using a peer-to-peer negotiator.
1. A priori knowledge. This microbenchmark is shown
in Figure 8a. At the beginning of the experiment, host
h1 is the only machine sending traffic, and can send
to the maximum shared limit. After 10 seconds, host
h2 joins the network, and begins to ask for increas-
ingly larger bandwidth allocations. This continues un-
til they agree that they have gone too far, and back off,
eventually agreeing on a 60/40 split. They stay at this
steady-state until h1 generates a short burst of traffic
at 50 seconds, and takes almost of the resources back.
Finally, they return to their 60/40 steady state.
2. AIMD adaptation. In Figure 8b, the two hosts dy-
namically adjust their resources using a congestion
control strategy similar to that employed by TCP. At
each time step, both hosts try to increase their cur-
rent allocation by 0.1 ∗ limit. If that increase would
exceed the shared cap, then the host halves its alloca-
tion. With this strategy, the hosts alternate maximum
allocations over time.
Renegotiation Overhead The time it takes for tenants
to renegotiate is dependent on the negotiation strategy
they use. Merlin provides the mechanism for setting the
new allocations. To measure the overhead for the nego-
tiator mechanism, we sent 1000 negotiation updates from
one host to another through a broker negotiator.
The average time to update the new allocations was
only 99 µs with a standard deviation of about 19µs.
This number is mostly dependent on the time it takes
a message to travel from one host to the other through
the broker. Updates are performed by writing the new
allocation into a file in the /proc filesystem exposed by
the kernel module.
8. Related Work
Merlin enforcers fall under a class of security mecha-
nisms known as execution monitoring [21]. Tagged poli-
cies implement a form of capabilities [16].
Merlin enlists end-hosts to perform distributed en-
forcement. A number of systems have explored the idea
of using end hosts to implement network functional-
ity. One related system to Merlin is End to the Middle
(ETTM) [5], a scalable and fault-tolerant network man-
ager that runs software in a trusted execution environ-
ment on end hosts. However, while in Merlin the end-
host component is a small, trusted interpreter, ETTM
allows for arbitrary packet-processing code. This inter-
preter allows Merlin to define a high-level language for
expressing policies, which ETTM does not provide.
Participatory Networking (PANE) [7] addresses a
complementary set of management concerns. PANE
identifies a standard interface by which an end host
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can request functionality from the network. For exam-
ple, PANE allows a host to explicitly reserve bandwidth
along a particular path. However, PANE does not pro-
vide a language for specifying network-wide properties,
or provide a way to enforce proper use of network re-
sources.
SideCar [22] and Fabric [3] adopt a hybrid network
architecture, where the first-hop software switches pro-
vide a programmable platform for deploying rich net-
work functionality, but the rest of the network is a simple
forwarding fabric. Our implementation of Merlin is in-
spired by the design of these architectures.
Merlin’s policy language is similar in spirit to the
high-level languages used in Frenetic [9], Ethane [2],
FML [12], and PANE [8].
EyeQ [14] enlists end hosts to help sharing of the net-
work. EyeQ hosts execute a sender module that regulates
the rate at which it sends traffic. Sender modules on dif-
ferent hosts provide fine-grained feedback about the set
of flows in the network to arbitrate bandwidth and pro-
vide congestion control. EyeQ is similar to Merlin in its
use of a forwarding fabric, and its use of end hosts to
enforce bandwidth properties. Unlike Merlin, EyeQ does
not provide a high-level language or compiler, or mecha-
nisms for enforcing other kinds of policies such as filter-
ing and routing.
Active Networks [24] were also based on the idea
of using the network as an “interpreter” for “programs”
encapsulated in packets. Unlike Merlin, Active Networks
envisioned tags as complete programs that could affect
both the switch state and the paths packets take through
the network. In contrast, Merlin requires essentially no
computation on switches.
9. Conclusion
The success of programmable network platforms has
demonstrated the benefits of providing high-level ab-
stractions for managing networks. Merlin compliments
these approaches by focusing on functionality beyond
routing policies. Merlin can be used to gather network
statistics, such as for accounting and billing; traffic filter-
ing, like a distributed firewall; or fine-grained resource
allocation and coordination. Used in coordination with
source-routing techniques, Merlin can enforce path and
routing properties.
The high-level design of Merlin, in which trusted in-
terpreters are installed on end-hosts to provide network
functionality and enforce policies, is powerful and flex-
ible. The policy transformations provided by Merlin ne-
gotiators makes the design feasible. Overall, Merlin’s ef-
ficient design and concise language greatly simplify the
task of network policy enforcement, and lays the foun-
dation for a variety of future research to further explore
network programmability.
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